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Abstract
Recent empirical studies concerning the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on economic
development have all been taking into account FDI as a whole. However, the theoretical
literature on the topic argues that more attention should be devoted to distinguishing FDI by
type, and suggests that FDI with high technological content might play a peculiar role. This
paper investigates the existence and the magnitude of this peculiar effect. With reference to
developing countries, we find strong evidence that countries with a larger population and a larger
stock of human capital, and countries that enjoy lesser uncertainty, are able to attract more FDI
with a higher technological content. We also find evidence pointing towards a positive
relationship between the share of technology embodied into FDI and the level of economic
development in the host country.
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1 Introduction
Among the many economic items that routinely attract the attention of both policy makers and
scholars  across the world, one in particular has been studied with special intensity recently, for
its alleged role as a propellent of economic development and growth. This item is Foreign Direct
Investment (henceforth FDI).3 Among the many issues that have been raised regarding FDI, two
are of interest here: first, and foremost, is FDI a good or a bad thing for the economy of the host
country, and then, quite naturally, given that even though with much controversy, many believe
FDI to be a good thing, what are the factors that cause FDI.
To date, a large number of empirical studies have been carried out to shed some light on
these issues, but, as it is so often the case with empirical research, its boundaries are being set by
the limitations in the availability of data that are required to study the particular variable
concerned. In the case of FDI, the area that those boundaries define, and that lends itself  to
being investigated, is of pretty limited size. This is because countries, particularly those in the
developing world, have only recently, in some cases very recently or not at all, started keeping
records of FDI, as the latter becomes more widely recognized to be a quantity of crucial interest
from social, economic and policy making standpoints. 
It is probably because of these data limitations that a startling discrepancy has appeared
between the empirical and the theoretical literature on FDI and its effects on the economies of
the host countries. On one hand, the literature on FDI has been stressing the heterogeneous
nature of FDI’s structure, with respect to the economic motivation behind FDI flows to the
typology of FDI (Barba-Navarretti and Venables, 2004), to the geographical origin and
destination of FDI flows and to the type of technology embodied in the various components that
make up FDI (Glass and Saggi, 1998). On the other hand, the empirical literature on FDI has
failed so far to fully account for the heterogeneity of FDI when studying the impact of FDI on
the economy of host nations (more details in the next section). 
Recent work on the economic motivation behind FDI flows, distinguishes between
market-seeking FDI and efficiency-seeking FDI. The former is said to occur when firms are
attracted by a host’s market size or by the size of the host’s neighbours’ markets. The firm’s
choice to supply foreign markets by local production rather than by exports, results typically in
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3 For a sample of studies that have devoted their attention to FDI, see next section.
the firm duplicating a subset of its activities in the foreign country, a type of investment that is
sometimes referred to as horizontal FDI (HFDI). 
Efficiency-seeking FDI tries to exploit lower factor costs in the host nation. This is
typically achieved by transferring entire phases of the production process to the low cost
country. For this reason, this type of FDI is also referred to as vertical FDI (VFDI)4. In the
present study we shall not make much of the difference between HFDI and VFDI, partly because
until recently the overwhelming proportion of FDI was horizontal rather than vertical, (Although
the share of VFDI has been increasing since the early 90s5), and partly because, in order to be
able to break the data down into horizontal and vertical investment, one would have to work with
firm level data that are likely to be available for developed countries only, if at all. By contrast,
in this study, as will become clear presently, we are going to work with data at the macro level
involving both developed and developing economies. We shall concentrate on the geographical
destination of receivers of FDI flows, and on the heterogeneous nature regarding the technology
embodied into FDI. 
With respect to the heterogeneous types of technologies embodied into FDI, a theoretical
literature that belongs to the strand of the new, endogenous growth theories, has come up with
models that establish a link between the degree of innovative and imitative activities, widely
thought to be crucial for the economic performance of host countries, and the quality of
technology that is transferred through FDI (Glass and Saggi, 1998). Because of the data
limitations discussed earlier, the empirical literature on FDI and economic growth, of which we
shall provide a brief account presently, remains, to the best of our knowledge, totally silent on
this topic. Indeed this literature invariably prefers to treat FDI in its entirety, as a scalar to be
included in the cross sectional, time series or panel regressions that constitute the backbone of all
these empirical studies.
The aim of this study is to fill the gap between the theoretical and empirical literatures,
by taking seriously the hints that the former has provided on the importance of distinguishing
FDI by type according to the level of technology embodied in it. Our objective is twofold: we
would like to show that the positive effect of FDI on the development of the receiving nation
pertains peculiarly to the type of FDI which has technology embodied in it. In other words, what
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5 The source of this information is again Barba-Navarretti and Venables (2004, Chapter 2, page 11).
4 For a summary on several typologies of FDI according to economic motivation, see the recent, comprehensive
book on multinational enterprises (MNEs) by Barba-Navarretti and Venables (2004).
we would like to show is that the heterogeneity in the technological content of diverse types of
FDI matters. In the process, we shall also look at the possible determinants of high tech FDI
flows. We would also like to show that such a positive effect, if it exists, will occur if the
receiving country is in the developing world. As a motivation, we argue that, because of the lack
of significant RnD expenditures and consequent innovative activities in developing countries,
transfers of technology through FDI may be a particularly important mode of getting these
countries nearer to the technology frontier.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews recent empirical literature
on FDI and economic growth; Section 3 lays out the econometric model to be estimated and
sketches the econometric challenges being faced in the estimation; Section 4 details data, data
sources and how the crucial variable “share of high tech FDI in total FDI” has been computed;
Section 5 illustrates the results of the estimation exercise, and finally Section 6 mentions
possible extensions and future line of work and draws conclusions.
2 A brief look at the existing empirical literature
Of all the literature which preoccupies itself with the effects of FDI on growth and development
in host countries, here we review a recent strand which we feel constitutes an important
precedent for this study, since its focus is on the effect of FDI on growth and development at a
macroeconomic, country-based level, the same as in the present study. This particular strand is
surprisingly thin, despite the fact that the overall literature on FDI and growth is quite abundant,
since a large part of it either uses data at firm level or is based on country specific studies (see
Barba-Navarretti and Venables, 2004 for an account). 
The first study to be surveyed is a cross-section study by Borensztein, De Gregorio and
Lee (1998), which is the empirical section of a paper that also features an interesting growth
model . These authors estimate the following basic equation6:
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6 Borenzstein et al gather data over a 20 years time interval, from 1970 to 1989. They use a number of different data
sources. For foreign direct investment, data come from an OECD publication, Geographical Distribution of
Financial Flows to Developing Countries, while other national accounts data, such as the growth rate of income,
initial income and government consumption are all taken from the so called Penn World Tables, by Summers and
Heston. Finally, data on human capital are taken from Barro and Lee (1993), and consist of average years of male
secondary schooling.
(2.1)g = c0 + c1FDI + c2FDI &H+ c3H+ c4Y0 + c5A
Where  is the rate of growth of per capita GDP,  is foreign direct investment and isg FDI
measured as a ratio to GDP,  is the stock of human capital,  is initial GDP per capita and isH Y0
meant to capture the role of the “catch-up” effect, and  is a group of control variables that areA
frequently included as determinants of growth in cross-country studies (see for an example,
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, chp.12). The main result of this study is that FDI is an important
determinant of economic growth only when a country has a minimum threshold stock of human
capital. In that case, the contribution to growth by foreign direct investment is found to be bigger
than that of domestic capital.
A similar study, by Alfaro et al. (2004), finds that well developed financial markets put
the positive contribution of FDI to economic growth beyond doubt. This study focuses on the
issues related to the measurement and handling of financial markets development, which is not
within the scope of our own study, and otherwise follows the same pattern of analysis as
Borenzstein et al. (1998). For this reason, we do not dwell further on it.
De Mello (1999), estimates the impact of foreign direct investment on capital output,
output and total factor productivity (TFP) by using both time series and panel data. The second
part of this study, the relevant one for our purposes, studies the impact of FDI on output and TFP
growth by estimating the following two dynamic panel data equations:
(2.2)xh(t) = 0 + 1FDIh(t) + 2xh(t − 1) + h(t)
or, if unobservable country-specific growth determinants are to be taken into account, the term 
becomes , a time-invariant individual country effect term, to yield the following equation:0 h,0
(2.3)xh(t) = h,0 + 1FDIh(t) + 2xh(t − 1) + h(t)
In both equations, De Mello indexes countries with h, and sets  , where y is output, kx = y, k, TFP
is capital, TFP is total factor productivity, and  is an error term. Because of the likely(t)
correlation between the regressors and the error terms, these equations are not estimated by using
ordinary least squares, but by using instrumental variables. The instruments chosen are the
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lagged dependent variables and lagged values of the host country’s per capita income as a share
of the U.S. Per capita income. The study uses a sample of 32 countries that are divided into
OECD and non-OECD countries. The period considered is 1970-90 and the source employed is
the Summers and Heston data set.
The outcome of this analysis is a positive impact of FDI on output growth in all panels,
and there is some evidence of substitutability between FDI and domestic investment. In more
advanced economies, the more efficient technologies embodied in FDI may lead to a higher rate
of technological obsolescence of the capital stock embodying older technologies. For the
technological laggards, complementarity seem to prevail. This degree of complementarity
suggests that those economies are either less efficient in the use of the new technologies
embodied in FDI, or that the latter are not much more modern or productive than the ones
existing in the recipient economy. Such findings call for further investigation of both what
determines how much of technology is embodied in FDI, and of the effect of the extent of high
tech FDI on the economic performance of the host country, particularly when the latter is a
developing economy.  
Another important paper we want to review is Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001). This
study has the merit of highlighting the serious problems that the kind of empirical work
discussed here may suffer if some crucial aspects are not properly handled. In particular, these
authors note that cross-section models, with their inherent lack of dynamic information, due to
the complete absence of the time dimension, run a much increased risk of omitted variable bias.
In other words ordinary least squares estimates can be biased in ways that are increasingly more
difficult to predict, the more variables are included in the regression. Alternative estimation
techniques, such as instrumental variable (IV) are often difficult to implement because of a lack
of suitable instruments. A further problem is that in a cross-sectional regression it may be
difficult to understand which way the causation runs. Taking the case we are studying as an
example, even if an equation that regressed FDI on output growth returned a positive coefficient
for FDI, this fact alone would not imply yet that FDI causes growth, as it could well be the other
way round. This problem is commonly known as endogeneity bias. Both the omitted variable
bias and the endogeneity bias can be ameliorated by taking the time dimension into account, that
is, by making use of panel data. With panel data, the analyst may include lagged dependent
variables which may help to control for both biases. Still, Nair-Reicher and Weinhold argue,
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even panel data models may not solve all the issues raised by cross-section analysis, particularly
if the traditional panel data fixed effect estimator is used. The application of this methodology
rests on imposing homogeneity assumptions on the coefficients of the lagged dependent
variables when in fact the dynamics are heterogeneous across the panel. Their suggestion is to
use an alternative method of estimation, which they call Mixed Fixed and Random Model for
causality testing in panel data. Here we do not review the technicalities of this method, as they
are beyond the scope of this review. We prefer to concentrate on describing the data used and the
results obtained. The data comprise a panel of 24 developing countries for the interval 1971 to
1995. The source is World Development Indicators by the World Bank, except from the data on
human capital, which is taken from Nehru et al. (1995) and is average years of schooling. As for
their results, Nair-Reichart and Weinhold (2001) adopt the following strategy: in order to put the
advantages of their methodology in sharp focus, they present results from a non-dynamic panel
study, from a dynamic panel estimated with the traditional fixed effect estimator, and from a
dynamic panel estimated with their own mixed fixed and random estimator. The latter shows that
while it is possible to speak on the whole of a positive causal relationship between FDI and
growth, it is also true that this effect is quite different across countries. The paper concludes by
stressing the need for future research to concentrate on country specific determinants of this
relationship between investment (both foreign and domestic) and growth. Although with the
caveats that have just been discussed, the three studies reviewed so far share as their common
feature that they find a positive relationship in some shape or form between FDI and economic
growth. By contrast there is another recent work, Carkovic and Levine (2002), whose main
finding is that (to quote from them, on page 3) “there is not a robust, causal link running from
FDI to economic growth”. 
Carkovic and Levine (2002) move the same kind of criticism as Nair-Reichart and
Weinhold (2001) to previous studies of the effect of FDI on the economy of the host country that
had the cross-sectional dimension only. They too claim that those earlier studies cannot properly
address problems such as simultaneity bias or country specific effects. In order to overcome
these problems, and extract consistent and efficient estimates of the impact of FDI on economic
growth, they embrace the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel estimator designed by
Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997). Carkovic and Levine (2002) use data
based on 72 countries (both developed and developing) over the period 1960-1995. Unlike
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Nair-Reichart and Weinhold (2001) though, they cannot find evidence of a link between FDI and
economic growth. Our suspicion is that, at least in part, this lack of evidence is due to the fact
that Carkovic and Levine (2002) use a pooled sample comprising both developed and developing
countries. We believe that FDI’s impact on the economy of the host country depends on the level
of economic development of that country. In particular, we argue that developing countries move
closer to the technological frontier because they can benefit from the technology transfer that
takes place owing to the occurrence of FDI. By contrast, developed countries achieve
technological progress by performing Research and Development activities. For this reason, the
impact of FDI as a carrier of technology in developed economies may be not so significant.
Because Carkovic and Levine (2002) use a pooled sample with both types of countries, the
positive impact of FDI on growth that stems from enjoying the arrival of new technologies may
go undetected. 
Other recent work, by de la Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001), independently finds no
evidence of a positive impact of inward FDI on productivity levels of the host country. This
study  uses a sample limited to 13 developed economies (over a time interval of 20 years,
between 1971 and 1990). It  would seem to confirm that FDI’s effect on developed countries’
economies is at best of difficult detection.
The fact is that despite the criticisms directed towards cross sectional studies by some of
these papers, their contradictory findings show that a deeper level of analysis, to account for
(among other things) technological and geographical heterogeneity is called for. Such depth
cannot be accomplished while at the same time pursuing methodological perfection, without
keeping the dataset from shrinking beyond an acceptable threshold. For this reason we stick with
a cross sectional study, whose design is explained  in the next section. 
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3 The econometric framework
As already discussed in Section 2.1, we want to contribute to the literature just reviewed, by
bringing to the fore, as a novel element, the importance of FDI with high technological content
in the economic process. In order to do so, we construct the variable “share of high tech FDI in
total FDI”, which we call   for brevity.HTFDIshare
We run regressions which are centered on ,  and we then contrast theseHTFDIshare
regressions with similar ones where the only change will be that FDI totals replace  .HTFDIshare
The latter regressions will look much like those in the papers reviewed in section 2.2. As a result
of this exercise, we hope to gather enough evidence to be able to unveil a positive relationship
between the share of FDI which embodies high technology, as defined below, and the impact the
latter has on economic performance. As this is a cross-sectional study with no time dimension,
such a positive relationship may not yet be proof of a causal link that runs from the technological
content of FDI to development. However the existence of a positive relationship and its
specificity to the sample of developing countries (as shown in Section 2.5.3 below) is certainly a
first step towards proving that causality.  
The equations to be estimated and the econometric issues that they raise will be discussed
in this section, while we will delay a detailed description of   and the other variablesHTFDIshare
that appear in the regressions, to the next Section 4 concerning the data, because the choices that
we have made as for which variables to include and how to construct them were partly dictated
by data availability (or lack thereof) and will be better understood along with the description of
the data itself.
As a point of departure, in order to derive the first regression, we want to test the claim
made by Glass and Saggi (1998) that among the factors responsible for spurring FDI with high
technological content in a given country, are resource endowments in that country and the
magnitude of the cost disadvantage suffered by multinational firms in that country relative to
domestic firms.
Following Romer (1990) we consider two types of resources. One is labor services,
measured by counts of people, in this case the population of the country concerned. The second
is the stock of human capital, as measured by average years of schooling in that country. As for
the cost disadvantage facing multinational firms, we assume that it can be represented by
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macroeconomic uncertainty in the country of interest; we take the inflation rate to be a proxy for
this variable and we measure it  by the GDP deflator. The argument for measuring the cost
disadvantage facing multinational firms with inflation is that expectations on inflation are less
costly to form for local firms than they are for foreign firms. Thus the ensuing regression looks
as follows:
(3.1)HTFDIsharei = 0 + 1 ln popi + 2Hi + 3 ln Infli + 1
Where   is “share of high tech FDI stock in total FDI stock for the secondaryHTFDIshare
sector”, to be accurately defined in section 4,  is the log of population,  is average yearslnpop H
of schooling and   is the log of the GDP deflator. The s are coefficients to be estimatedlnInfl 
and is a random error term. The subscript   indexes the number of countries1 i = 1, ..., 29
included in the sample, while time-wise, all the observation refer to 1990, unless otherwise
indicated. 
The second equation we want to estimate serves the purpose of measuring the impact of
FDI on economic performance, the same way as the literature reviewed in section 2 above.
Because we deal with a cross section in a specific year (1990), and because all our data
concerning FDI refer to stock and not flow, we do not employ the growth rate of output (g) as
the dependent variable. The growth rate of output for 1990 does not have a meaningful
relationship with FDI stock in 1990, while, if we were to take an average growth rate over a
period of time, the choice of the time interval would be arbitrary and likely to be detached from
the time interval involving FDI stock data, since it is difficult to gauge precisely the time interval
over which the stock of FDI was formed. We instead employ the log of GDP per capita (in
constant 1995 U.S. $) as the dependent variable. This variable is intended to proxy for a
country’s level of development. Hence the second equation of the model looks as follows:
 (3.2)ln GDPprci = 0 + 1HTFDIsharei + 2 ln popi + 3 ln Infli + 2
Where the s are the coefficients to be estimated and  is a (different) random error term. Notice 2
that besides the high tech FDI share, we control for size, measured by population and
macroeconomic uncertainty, measured by inflation.
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As for the estimation technique to be used, if OLS were to be employed, the estimate of
the coefficient attached to  would not be unbiased, because we assumed 1 HTFDIshare
 to depend on the regressors of the first equation, population, average years ofHTFDIshare
schooling and inflation, two of which are also thought to have an effect on GDP per capita. As a
result, one of the crucial assumptions for unbiased OLS estimation, that the regressor 
 and the error term  be uncorrelated, would no longer hold. In order to overcomeHTFDIshare 2
this potential flaw, we employ 2SLS estimation instead, and use  (average years of schooling)H
as the instrument in the IV estimation process. Therefore,  regression (3.1) as reported above
constitutes the first step in the 2SLS estimation procedure, while equation (3.2) is the second
step. Notwithstanding the endogeneity problem mentioned, we also perform OLS estimation on
the same equations, so to have a yardstick for comparing results and checking for their
robustness.
It is a well known fact that when implementing instrumental variable estimation, the
choice of instruments determines whether the estimates so obtained are efficient and consistent.
A valid instrument is highly correlated with the variable to be instrumented, but shows no
correlation with the other endogenous variable(s) in the system. A weak instrument, one that is
only weakly correlated to the endogenous variable to be instrumented, decreases the efficiency
of the estimate, by yielding much higher standard errors than it would be the case with valid
instruments. In section 2.5 we will argue that  is a valid instrument, since results therein pointHi
to the lack of a significant relationship with gdp per capita, and to a strong relationship to the
instrumented variable  . HTFDIshare
At this point, we have to recall the twofold nature of our aim, which is firstly to gather
evidence for the economy-fostering role played by the quality of technology embodied in FDI
rather than the absolute level of FDI per se, and secondly, to show that this role is peculiar to
developing countries. To achieve the first end, the second step in our strategy is to go through
the same estimation procedure as just explained, but to replace the variable  withHTFDIshare
FDI stock total throughout the two equations (3.1) and (3.2). 
Such a strategy should shed light on any difference that might exist between HTFDIshare
and FDI stock total, when everything else in the regressions is held constant. We thus estimate
the following two equations:
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 (3.3)lnFDItoti = 0 + 1 lnpopi + 2Hi + 3 ln Infli + u1
(3.4)lnGDPprci = 0 + 1 lnpopi + 2 ln Infli + 3 lnFDItoti + u2
Where all the variables are as in equations (3.1) and (3.2), except that now , standing forlnFDItot
FDI stock total in secondary sector (in logs), has replaced the variable  . TheHTFDIshare
subscript  still indexes countries, while the reference year, unless otherwise indicated, is stilli
1990. To show the peculiarity of our results to developing countries, the same regressions are
repeated for a different set of OECD “developed” countries. 
The next section, Section 4, provides an ample and detailed description of the variables
included in the regressions and of the data and data sources employed. Regression results will be
illustrated in Section 5. 
4 Description of variables and data
Starting with (3.1), the dependent variable in that equation is “share of high tech FDI in
total FDI”, in short  . The variable  can be thought of as the ratio “highHTFDIshare HTFDIshare
tech FDI / total FDI”. In order to compute the numerator of this ratio, we needed to find FDI data
classified by sector in a way that would enable us to decide which sector is high tech and which
one is not. The only source of FDI data that came close to satisfying such a requirement was the
series World Investment Directory published by UNCTC (an arm of the United Nations).
Therefore we have relied heavily on this source for getting FDI data. A drawback of this strategy
is that, for the most crucial variable of this study, matters such as sample size, which countries to
include in the sample, which year to take as reference year, have all been determined by the
availability of suitable data in this single data source. 
The World Investment Directory (henceforth W.I.D.) classifies FDI data according to the
U.N. International Standard Classification (ISIC) Revision 3. This is a very detailed and accurate
classification of economic activities, which makes the task of selecting the high tech sectors, to
be included in the numerator of  , far easier.  To illustrate, under the itemHTFDIshare
“Manufacturing” (item D in ISIC Rev. 3) the reader can find the whole array of manufacturing
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sectors, apparently put in ascending order of technological content, starting with item 15,
“manufacture of food products and beverages”, all the way down to end with such items as item
32, ”manufacture of radio television and communication apparatus”, item 33, “manufacture of
medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks”, item 34, “manufacture of motor
vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers”, item 35, “manufacture of other transport equipment”, and
item 36, “other manufacturing”.
In choosing the criterion for picking high tech investments, we were unable to find any
guideline in previous studies. Therefore we adopted the following simple approach. Since the
sectors in ISIC Rev. 3 are classified in ascending order of technological content, the only issue
remained where to put the boundary between what is high tech and what is not. We decided to
classify as high tech, investments located under item 29, “manufacture of machinery and
equipment”, to item 36, “other manufacturing”, inclusive. We have also added the subcategory
“pharmaceuticals, medical chemicals etc.” (item 2423 in ISIC Rev. 3) which fell on the wrong
side of the boundary, because we felt it was a sector requiring a sufficiently sophisticated
know-how, to warrant a move to the high tech group. 
Thus far we have discussed the ISIC Rev. 3 and the W.I.D. Classifications
interchangeably. In fact the latter identifies the sectors of economic activity with a terminology
that draws very heavily from ISIC Rev. 3, but nevertheless differs slightly from it. For our
purposes it is sufficient to note that item D, “Manufacturing” of ISIC Rev. 3 is referred to as
“Secondary sector” by W.I.D. All the sectors that precede this item are collected by W.I.D. under
the term “Primary sector”, while the sectors that follow item D, are grouped by W.I.D. under the
term “Tertiary sector”. This study sticks with the classifications and regroupings made by the
W.I.D. Furthermore, since data for the primary and tertiary sector were not always available, we
decided to base the computations on the figures from the secondary sector only. Hence, while the
numerator of   , “high tech FDI”, is computed with the criterion discussed above, theHTFDIshare
denominator, “total FDI”, consists of the sum of FDI totals for the secondary sector.
Other important features concerning the variable    are as follows: the sampleHTFDIshare
includes some 30 developing countries from three main regions: Latin America, East Asia and
Eastern Europe. In the sample there are no countries from Africa or the Middle East, as we were
not able to find any satisfactory data for those regions. Given the cross sectional nature of this
study, we decided to work with FDI stock rather than flow, as the former gives a more accurate
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picture of past history for every given country. The data are mostly from 1990, the last year for
which FDI stock for Latin America were available, so that the sample can include as many
countries as possible.  Where 1990 data were not available, we considered the  year immediately
preceding or following 1990. FDI stock data are often given as “approved FDI stock” and/or
“actual FDI stock”. The two sets of figures differ considerably. Because approved FDI data were
more widely available than the actual data, we have chosen to use approved figures as much as
possible, and resort to actual figures only when the former was not available. 
The only countries for which we could find data for FDI stock both on an approved and
actual basis, from the same source, were as follows:
y Indonesia (secondary sector total 1994, in million U.S $): 65 (approved), 19 (actual)
y Malaysia (secondary sector total 1990, in million ringgit): 35 (approved), 15 (actual)
The discrepancy between approved and actual figures does exist, as aknowledged also in
the U.N. World Investment Directory (Vol. VII, Asia and the Pacific, page 53): 
“Many countries have a variety of sources for FDI data, including those collected by the central bank for
balance-of-payment purposes and those collected by the board of investment or a similar institution for monitoring
and investment promotion purposes…A typical occurrence is that data provided by those institutions are on
approved FDI investments rather than on the investments actually implemented…In such cases, data on approved
investments provide crucial information, but their limitations must be aknowledged. Normally, approved
investments are larger than those actually implemented.” 
While we are ready to acknowledge the problems involved in using both approved and
actual FDI data, we do know that this is the only way to keep the sample size from shrinking in a
way that would make this study unfeasible.
For a few countries (China, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey), we could only find FDI totals
for the secondary sector without the desired breakdown. In order to obtain a share, for these
cases we employed as numerator data on “high tech manufacturing exports”, from the World
Bank7. Under the assumption that these are developing countries wherein not much high tech
production originates from domestic capital, the difference between high tech manufacturing
FDI and high tech manufacturing exports ought, in theory, not to be large8. 
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8 We made a check by comparing  by using both high tech manufacturing exports and W.I.D. HighHTFDIshare
7 Since the high tech exports figure is a flow, the variable   is computed by using FDI flow dataHTFDIshare
(from the World Bank) as denominator.
As for the other variables included in 3.1 and 3.2, data on population, inflation, and GDP
per capita (the latter in 1995 constant U.S. $) all come from the source World Development
Indicators Online (various issues, but especially 2001) published by the World Bank. Finally the
variable H, “average years of schooling”, comes from the dataset on education to be found in
Barro and Lee (1997).
As for the sample of OECD economies, the sample consists of 19 countries (those that
were current OECD members in 1990 for which the data were complete). While the variables are
constructed in the same way as for the sample of developing countries, the source that has been
employed for the FDI data was the OECD own FDI dataset. Sources of data for the remaining
variables were the same as for the set of developing countries. More details on variables, data
and data sources, along with descriptive statistics, is provided in the appendix to this study.
5 Regression results
For the reasons discussed in Section 3, we perform 2SLS estimation on equations (3.1)
and (3.2), where (3.1) is the first stage of the estimation procedure, which goes on to feed (3.2)
for the second stage. The tables below report the regression results:
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tech FDI data. Although the results are not fully satisfactory (the difference exists indeed), we still do it this way,
both because without those countries the sample would be too small, and because this difference can be ascribed
more to the fact that FDI flow figures used here are actual flows, while the FDI stock figures used to compute 
 using the W.D.I. Source are often approved figures, than to high tech exports not being a goodHTFDIshare
proxy for high tech FDI in developing countries. Put simply, the discrepancy is due more to denominator than to
numerator differences.  
Table 1 - First stage results of 2SLS regression of HTFDIshare on selected independent
variables. OLS regression yields same results - 29 observations
7.73***F test of joint significance
0.5Adj. R-square
29No. observations
-0.04 (0.018)**lnInfl
0.045 (0.018)**lnpop
0.06 (0.012) ***H
OLS and 2SLS (first stage)
Dependent Variable:  HTFDIshareIndependent Variable
Table 2 - Second stage results of 2SLS and OLS regressions of log GDP per capita on selected
independent variables - 29 observations
6.96***5.84***2.267.73***F test of joint
significance
0.460.27-0.45Adj. R-square
29292929No. Observations
0.14 ( 0.11) --0.21 (0.25) 0.19 ( 0.12)lnInfl
-0.39 (0.11)***-0.23 (0.17)--0.45 ( 0.10)*** lnpop
0.08 (0.09)0.28 (0.2)0.59 (0.25)**-H
2.19 (1.09)* -1.23 (2.9)-6.48 (4.14)3.57 (1.17)***HTFDIshare
OLS2SLS (3)2SLS (2) 2SLS (1) 
Dependent Variable: lnGDPprcIndependent Var.
Note: Tables show coefficient values with standard errors in parentheses. In Table 2, (1): second
stage of 2SLS regression where instrument is average years of schooling (  ), (2): second stageH
of 2SLS regression where instrument is log of population (  ), (3): second stage of 2SLSlnpop
regression where instrument is log of GDP deflator (  ). *= significant at 10%; **=lnInfl
significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%.
The output for (3.1) (first stage regression), from Table 1, is entirely as expected. All the
coefficients attached to the three regressors are statistically significant at the 5% level, and all
carry the signs predicted by the theory. So the resources population and human capital have a
positive impact on the share of high tech FDI, while , which is a measure oflnInfl
macroeconomic instability, has a negative impact on  .HTFDIshare
In Table 2, the first three columns show results for the second stage of the 2SLS
estimation procedure. The order condition for identification of the system (3.1, 3.2), dictates that
the number of excluded exogenous variables (instruments) be equal to the number of included
endogenous variables to be instrumented. In order to satisfy this condition, the variable that is
chosen as instrument in each column, is excluded from the regression shown in that column.With
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the results from Table 2 in hand, we are now in a position to explain and justify the choice of  H
as our preferred instrument and to comment the evidence gathered following this choice. 
We said earlier that valid instruments are strongly correlated with the endogenous
variable to be instrumented (here,  ), but they are exogenous with respect to theHTFDIshare
other endogenous variables of the system (here,  ). It is a property of valid instrumentslnGDPprc
that the stronger the correlation between the instrument and the instrumented endogenous
variable, the smaller the standard error of that endogenous variable in the second stage
regression. Therefore, in order to assess our instruments against this criterion, we look in Table 2
at the standard errors attached to   in each of the first three colums. We see that theHTFDIshare
smallest standard error (1.17) which affects the coefficient attached to   is the oneHTFDIshare
obtained when  is chosen as instrument (under 2SLS (1)). This fact points to a strongerH
relationship of   with    than that enjoyed by the other two candidates asH HTFDIshare
instruments9.
To assess the exogeneity of the instruments with respect to  , we use the OLSlnGDPprc
regression of Table 2, column 4. That regression says that   and   have no relationshipH lnInfl
with  , while  appears to have a strong relationship with  . The resultlnGDPprc lnpop lnGDPprc
concerning  and   may seem to be against commonly accepted economic theory, butH lnGDPprc
it actually makes sense for the sample of developing countries gathered here. This sample
includes countries from three main geographic regions: Eastern Europe, the Far East and Latin
America. As such, this sample exhibits the following two traits: first, the countries from the
former Soviet Bloc are characterized by far higher rates of literacy than those of other countries
at a similar stage of development.  Second, the countries of Latin America feature a distribution
of human capital stock that is as heterogeneous as their income distribution, but which does not
always follow the same pattern as the income distribution. For instance, while in terms of income
the ranking of Argentina, Brazil and Chile is as just listed, Chile is far poorer than its two bigger
neighbours. In terms of years of schooling the ranking becomes Argentina (7.77), Chile (7.14)
and Brazil (3.76), with Chile very close to Argentina and Brazil very much behind.
16
9 For a quick check, we run a simple regression of   separately on each of the candidate instruments.HTFDIshare
This regression returned coefficient values that were highly significant in the case of  , but failed to pass allH
significance thresholds both in the case of  and of .lnpop lnInfl
In order to have complete peace of mind on the matter of choosing the right instrument,
as a further check, we compare each 2SLS regression with the OLS regression and see that the
latter confirms the sign and the significance of the 2 SLS regression of column (1), the one
where  is chosen10.  H
If we move on to assess the evidence presented in Table 2, column 1, the crucial result
appears to be that the impact of   on the level of per capita income is positive andHTFDIshare
significant. We also notice that population has a negative and significant impact on  ,lnGDPprc
possibly because population itself appears in the denominator of GDP per capita, so that when
total GDP is held constant, a rise in population causes a fall in GDP per capita. Finally, the
coefficient attached to   is positive but not significant, and cannot lead to conclusions inlnInfl
either direction. 
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Our next step is to check that these results do not change dramatically if we modify some of the
choices that were made in the design of this model. Our sensitivity analysis will consist of
rerunning the regressions (3.1) and (3.2) after making the following three changes.
Firstly, substitute the adopted concept of high tech FDI with a more restrictive one. This
will consider as high tech only FDI falling into categories from “radio TV and communication
equipment” to “other manufacturing” (see Appendix). Call this new share . Such aHTFDIshare2
change will serve the purpose of checking whether our definition of high tech FDI is robust to a
different choice of categories to be included into it. 
Secondly, exclude from the sample the four countries for which high tech FDI had been
calculated differently, by using high tech exports in the numerator. Call this one .HTFDIshare3
In this way, we check that those four countries are not responsible for altering the results of the
study. 
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10Incidentally, it can also be seen that when  is the instrument, the value of the F statistic for jointlnpop
significance is very low.
Table 3 - Sensitivity analysis- first stage regressions
0.160.580.460.5Adj R-squared
2.66 *12.17 ***8.11***10.32 ***F (Prob > F)
26252629Number of obs
1.04
(0.47)**
0.05
(0.01)***
0.02
(0.00)***
0.06
(0.012)***
H
-1.10
(0.62)*
-0.05
(0.02)***
0.00
(0.01)
-0.04
(-0.018)**
lnInfl
0.25
(0.6)
0.07
(0.02)***
0.047
(0.01)***
0.045
(0.018)**
lnpop
HTFDIshare4
26 obs
HTFDIshare3
25 obs
HTFDIshare2
26 obs
HTFDIshare
29 obs
Dependent variableIndependent
Variable
Table 4 - Sensitivity analysis - Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions
00.44-0.45Adj R-squared
4.30 **6.06 **2.82*7.73***F (Prob > F)
26252629Number of obs
0.26
(0.19)
0.218
(0.13)*
-0.065
(0.16)
0.19
(0.12)
lnInfl
-0.38
(0.14)**
-0.56
(0.14)***
-0.72
(0.25)***
-0.45
(0.1)***
lnpop
0.24
(0.10)**
4.15
(1.31)***
9.51
(4.60)*
3.57
(1.17)***
HTFDIshare
 (4)lnGDPprc (3)lnGDPprc (2)lnGDPprc (1)lnGDPprc
Dependent variableIndependent
Variable
Notes: Tables show coefficient values with standard errors in parentheses. The four regressions
are one for each different  :  (1) = from the basic model, (2) =  , (3) =  HTFDIshare HTFDIshare2
 ,  (4) =  , as explained in the text. No. of observations same as inHTFDIshare3 HTFDIshare4
first stage regression (see table 3). *=significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***=significant
at 1% level.
Finally, when computing the high tech FDI share, use the value of high tech exports in
place of high tech FDI  for the whole sample, instead of just the four countries for which detailed
FDI data were not available. We let this share be . This procedure provides a checkHTFDIshare4
on the robustness of using alternative criteria when detailed FDI data are not available.
A glance at the first stage regressions confirms signs and significance of coefficients in
most cases. The exceptions are the coefficients of   in (4) and of   in (2). It islnpop lnInfl
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especially important that the results regarding positivity and significance of coefficient go
through for the human capital regressor represented by average years of schooling. 
The second stage instrumental variable regression confirms positivity and significance of
the coefficient attached to the share of high tech FDI, measured in four different ways. The sole
instance in which significance is not as strong concerns the relationship between a restricted
version of  and  (column denoted  (2)). Even there, the amountHTFDIshare lnGDPprc lnGDPprc
by which the 5% threshold is missed (p-value = 0.051) does not seem to indicate a lack of
robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the variable  . HTFDIshare
This result, along with the one relative to human capital, confirms robustness of the
double positive  relationship from human capital to high tech FDI and from the latter to the level
of GDP per capita that had been found in the basic model. Although such a positive relationship
is not yet proof of a causal link that runs from the technological content of FDI to development,
because of the lack of a dynamic dimension ineherent in such cross-sectional studies, its
existence and specificity to the sample of developing countries (also see Section 3 below) may
be considered as a significant contribution towards proving that causality.
 
5.2 Results when using FDI total instead of high tech FDI share
The next step is to run regressions (3.3) and (3.4) and compare the output from that set of
regressions with the results obtained for regressions (3.1) and (3.2).  In Table 5 below, we report
the regression output for (3.3) and (3.4) together with the regression output for regressions (3.1)
and (3.2), in order to facilitate comparison.
This result is completely different from the previous one. In the first stage regression,
among the three regressors, population is the only one that retains its positive and significant
impact, while the coefficients attached to human capital and inflation are no longer significant at
any level. Even more importantly, in the second stage regression none of the regressors has any
significant impact on the level of GDP per capita, least of all the total FDI stock of the secondary
sector.
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Table 5 - First stage regressions - 29 observations
0.10.5Adj R-squared
2.0310.32 ***F (Prob > F)
2929Number of obs
0.08
(0.20)
0.06
(0.012)***
H
-0.15
(0.29)
-0.04
(0.018)**
lnInfl
0.69
(0.29)**
0.045
(0.018)**
lnpop
 (3.3)lnFDItot (3.1)HTFDIshare
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Table 6 - Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions - 29 observations
-0.45Adj R-squared
0.187.73 ***F (Prob>F)
2929Number of obs
0.43
(1.11)
0.19
(0.12)*
lnInfl
-2.05
(3.72)
-0.45
(0.10)***
lnpop
2.52
(5.49)
3.57
(1.17)***
 (Lnfdiss)HTFDIshare
 (2)lnGDPprc (1)lnGDPprc
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Notes: in regressions (3.1) and (3.2) (central column) instrumented is   , InstrumentsHTFDIshare
are:    , ,  ; in regressions (3.3) and (3.4) (last column) instrumented is  ,lnpop lnInfl H lnFDItot
instruments are  ,  ,  . Information regarding coefficient values, standard errors andlnpop lnInfl H
significance levels is provided the same way as in the sensitivity analysis Tables 3 and 4.
The message is at the same time startling and clear: the double positive relationship that
feeds from resources endowments (particularly human capital) and macroeconomic stability into
foreign direct investment and from the latter into the level of per capita income is by no means a
foregone conclusion. On the contrary, it surfaces only when we put the share of high technology
FDI in the middle of this chain, while it disappears if the FDI total is considered instead.
The conclusion just drawn, while startling, should not surprise those that have followed
developments in the theory of economic growth over the last decade. The latter has long
identified  technological change as the root cause of long run economic growth. In developing
countries, the sole engine of technological change are the technology transfers from the
developed regions, given the almost total lack of any significant local RnD activity. Most likely,
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the vehicle that permits these technology transfers is foreign direct investment, which in turn is
attracted to a developing country if the latter is well endowed with resources and can provide a
stable environment. It is important to notice that the findings of this section in some sense can
reconcile the contrasting evidence reached by the works reviewed in Section 2, by putting those
contradictions down to their failure to account for the technological heterogeneity of FDI.
5.3 Results when using OECD dataset instead of developing countries dataset
As a final check for the relevance of our results, we run the same regressions (3.1) and (3.2) for a
data set of OECD countries, leaving the investigation design unchanged, with the same variables
and the same 2SLS procedure. Failure to obtain evidence in favor of the double positive
relationship from resource endowments to the share of high tech FDI, and from the latter to the
level of GDP per capita, would mean that the opposite results which the developing countries
regressions produced may have indeed been due to the reasons peculiar to those developing
countries that were outlined above. The results from the OECD regressions were as shown in
Tables 7 and 8.
Even though the regression equation (3.1) is jointly significant at the 5% level, as shown  
by the value achieved by the F statistic, of the coefficients associated with the independent
variables, only that of log population was statistically significant (at 10%). Its negative sign may
be explained by the fact that for OECD countries, the larger the country, the stronger will be any
domestic competition, which might scare FDI from flowing into the country concerned.
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Table 7 - First stage regressions - 19 observations
0.370.5Adj R-squared
4.50**10.32 ***F (Prob > F)
1929Number of obs
-0.02
(0.02)
0.06
(0.012)***
H
0.093
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.018)**
lnInfl
-0.05
(0.03)*
0.045
(0.018)**
lnpop
 (3.1 OECD)HTFDIshare (3.1)HTFDIshare
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Table 8 - Instrumental variables (2SLS) regressions - 19 observations
-0.45Adj R-squared
2.377.73 ***F (Prob>F)
1929Number of obs
-0.10
(0.5)
0.19
(0.12)*
lnInfl
-0.10
(0.2)
-0.45
(0.10)***
lnpop
-3.10
(3.81)
3.57
(1.17)***
 (HTFDIshare HTFDIshare
OECD )
 (OECD)lnGDPprc (1)lnGDPprc
Dependent VariableIndependent Variable
Notes: in regressions (3.1) and (3.2) (central column) instrumented is   , InstrumentsHTFDIshare
are:    , ,  ; in regressions (3.3) and (3.4) (last column) instrumented is lnpop lnInfl H HTFDIshare
OECD, instruments are  ,  ,  . Information regarding coefficient values, standardlnpop lnInfl H
errors etc. and significance levels is provided the same way as in the sensitivity analysis Tables
3 and 4.
In the second stage (regression 3.2), the test for overall statistical significance also failed.
Furthermore, all the individual coefficients of the regressors,did not return statistically
significant values. This evidence from regression (3.2) is most interesting if contrasted with that
from regression (3.2) for the cross-section of developing countries (see Table 8). There,
individual coefficients with respect to the share of high tech FDI and   were highlylnpop
significant, the former with a positive sign and the latter with a negative sign. The coefficient
attached to    had a positive sign, but it was significant only at the 10% level. ThelnInfl
contrasting findings relative to the effect that a higher share of technology embodied into FDI
may have on development, as measured by , depending on whether the samplelnGDPprc
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employed is of developing or of OECD countries, is a further, clear indication that developing
countries are rather peculiar with respect to the way technological change comes about. Failure
to account for this geographical heterogeneity, may be one further reason that leads to the
contradictory results underscored in Section 2.
 
6 Conclusions and suggestions for future work
This study attempted to gather evidence in favour of the positive impact of FDI on economic
development. We found that the technological intensity of FDI has a positive impact on the
development of those countries that we call developing. The two important qualifications here
are that FDI is heterogeneous with respect to the technology embodied in it, and that FDI can
have a different impact if the receiving nations are at different stages of their development. In
particular we argued that the positive role played by FDI depends on its acting as a vehicle for
technology transfers. It follows that this role is best fulfilled when the technological intensity of
FDI is higher, and when the receiving nation’s main mode of achieving technical progress is the
technology that it receives from overseas. Developing countries fit this description much more
closely than rich countries, for whom the main mode of achieving technical progress are research
and development activities. 
We also found that a good way to attract high tech FDI is to grow a good stock of human
capital and to make sure that the macroeconomic context is as stable as possible. The caveat is
that this is a cross sectional study, and as such it may suffer from all the problems noted by
Nair-Reicher and Weinhold (2001 and by Carkovic and Levine (2002). However, these problems
should be ameliorated, if not eliminated, by the fact that, in our two stages least squares
estimation, we instrument the crucial variable    with average years of schooling. HTFDIshare
Future work may advance knowledge on this topic in several ways. An obvious one
would be to remake the analysis carried out here, but with improved data, as they become
available. The time dimension could be introduced, by considering FDI flow data for an interval
of time, for those countries that have them. If not enough countries have these data, one might
restrict the study to one of the three regions considered here, East Asia for instance. The addition
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of the time dimension may well shed some further light even with the restriction to one region
only. 
Another possible extension might involve replacing GDP as the dependent variable with
others such as domestic investment or employment, in order to explore the effect of high tech
FDI on these important quantities.
Yet another possibility, as a follow-up to Section 3 above, is, for the OECD dataset, to
base all the regressions discussed thus far on RnD activities, rather than high tech FDI. The
expected result here would be that in OECD countries, as FDI is not the sole or even the main
carrier of technological change, RnD activities, in close parallel  to the role played by high tech
FDI in developing countries, have a positive effect on the economic performance of rich
countries..
The extensions suggested here should keep researchers keen on this topic for a long time,
so that enough research output can be produced to aid policy makers in their quest for a more
wealthy future for their countries.
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Appendix 
The 29 countries included in the developing world sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Dominican Rep., El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Bangladesh, China, Honk Hong, India, Indonesia (93), Malaysia, Philippines, Rep. of
 Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland.
Table A1 shows summary statistics for all the variables included in regressions 3.1 to 3.4
when using the developing world sample.
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in regressions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4,
pertaining the sample of 29 developing countries
5.970.591.462.9429lnInfl
391.11.8104.7758.5429infl (% annual growth)
10.352.192.25.8829H (years)
20.8514.931.5217.0729lnpop
1,140,000,0003,047,000254,000,000103,000,00029pop (units)
10.620.262.396.8429lnFDItot
40,897.301.309,936.705,837.7829FDItot (U.S.$ millions)
21.1504.992.4626HTFDIshare4
0.7500.20.3325HTFDIshare3
0.32-0.020.10.1126HTFDIshare2
0.7500.20.3229HTFDIshare
9.845.631.057.6729 lnGDPprc
18,8132774,4723,62629GDPprc (1995 U.S. $)
MaxMin Std. Dev.MeanObsVariable
The variable   is the log of GDP per capita measured in 1990, in constant 1995lnGDPprc
U.S. $. The data source is the World Development Indicators Online (various issues, but
especially 2001) published by the World Bank
The variable  has been computed as described in the main text (Section 4),HTFDIshare
by using the following Classification of Economic Activities found in U.N. World Investment
Directory FDI data:
PRIMARY SECTOR
Agriculture
Mining and quarrying
Petroleum
SECONDARY SECTOR
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles,  leather and clothing 
Paper
Chemicals
Basic chemicals
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Pharmaceuticals, medic. chem. etc.
Coal and petroleum products
Rubber products
Non-metallic mineral products
Metals
Mechanical equipment
Electrical equipment
Radio, tv and communication equip.
Medical, precision and optical instr.
Motor vehicles
Other transport equipment
Other manufacturing
TERTIARY SECTOR
Electricity, gas and water supply
Construction
Distributive trade
Hotels and restaurants
Transport and storage
Communication
Finance and insurance
Real estate
Other services
Other unspecified
The remaining high tech FDI shares have been calculated as explained in Section 5.1 of
the main text. Because of missing or incomplete data, the following countries could not be
included in the sample: Mexico, China and Turkey when computing ; Mexico,HTFDIshare2
China, Indonesia and Turkey when computing ; Dominican Republic, Bulgaria andHTFDIshare3
Chechoslovakia when computing  .HTFDIshare4
The variable   is the logged total FDI stock in the secondary sector for the yearlnFDItot
1990. The source for these data are various issues of the World Investment Directory series,
published by the UNCTAD. The datum on total FDI stock in the secondary sector for China was
not available directly and was therefore computed as follows: Total FDI stock in 1990 * share of
secondary sector FDI in total FDI in 1990 for developing countries (Source: UNCTAD, Press
Release 2003).
The variable   is the logged gdp implicit deflator calculated as an average annual %lnInfl
growth over the 10 years interval 1980-1990. The data source is the same as for the variable 
.lnGDPprc
The variable H, "average years of schooling", is the average number of years spent in
school (including first level, second level and post-secondary) by the population aged 25 years
and over, for the year 1990.  The data source is the Barro and Lee dataset on education (see
Barro and Lee, 1997). The datum on China comes from the Summary Education Profile on
China of the World Bank, available at the following web address:
http://devdata.worldbank.org/edstats/SummaryEducationProfiles/CountryData/GetShowData.asp
?sCtry=CHN,China.
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Finally, the variable   is the logged population total for the year 1990 in each of thelnpop
29 countries sampled. The source of the data is the World Development Indicators Online
(various issues, but especially 2001) published by the World Bank.
The 19 OECD countries considered were: Australia, Austria (91), Canada, Denmark,
Finland (94), France, Germany, Greece (99), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands (93), Norway,
Portugal (95), Spain (00), Sweden (96), Switzerland (93), United Kingdom (94), United States.
In order to avoid overlapping with the sample of developing countries, the criterion
followed was to include all those countries that were OECD members in 1990 for which data
were available. FDI stock data refer to 1990 unless otherwise indicated in parentheses for the
countries concerned. In the case of Greece and Spain, FDI stock data by sectors of industry were
not available, so the variable  was calculated as the ratio of the sales obtained by theHTFDIshare
largest affiliates of foreign Trans National Corporations (TNC) in high tech sectors, to the total
sales of the largest affiliates of foreign TNC in manufacturing. Table A2 shows descriptive
statistics for the sample of 19 OECD countries.
Table A2 - Descriptive Statistics for the variables used in regressions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4,
pertaining the sample of 19 OECD countries
2.960.470.671.719lnInfl
19.31.64.796.7419Infl (% annual growth)
124.541.98.9319H (years)
19.3315.071.2516.7719lnpop
249,000,0003,505,80059,900,00041,300,00019pop (units)
0.7300.180.419HTFDIshare
10.699.280.3910.0219lnGDPprc
43,831.3410,691.838,835.6523,987.4519GDPprc (1995 U.S.$)
MaxMinStd. Dev.Mean   ObsVariable
The source for the FDI data was the OECD own FDI dataset, while for the remaining variables
the sources were the same as for the set of developing countries.
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